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PUZZLING ABOUT STATE EXCUSES AS AN
INSTANCE OF GROUP EXCUSES
François Tanguay-Renaud*
A. WHY REFLECT UPON STATE EXCUSES & HOW I INTEND TO DO SO
Can the state, as opposed to its individual human members in their
personal capacity, intelligibly seek to avoid blame for unjustified
wrongdoing by invoking duress, provocation, a reasonable mistake in
justification, or other types of excuses? Insofar as it can, should such
claims ever be given moral and legal recognition? It is certainly not
uncommon to encounter offhand statements to the effect that at least some
state excuses are both conceivable and legitimate. 1 Yet, the issue has yet
to receive the sustained philosophical attention it deserves. Few theorists
speak to it specifically, and those who do typically discard rather rashly
the possibility of genuine state excuses. This theoretical neglect is
symptomatic of a more general lack of analytical attention to the
conditions that must obtain for the state to be legitimately held responsible
for wrongdoing in law and morality. In this chapter, my aim is to start
filling this gap by mapping out the topic of state excuses in a way that
will, hopefully, spur a more systematic discussion of its various facets,
*Assistant Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, and Member of the Graduate Faculty
of the Department of Philosophy, York University, Toronto. I would like to thank Antony
Duff, Timothy Endicott, John Gardner, Stuart P. Green, Philip Pettit, Andrew Simester,
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Victor Tadros, and Ekow Yankah for constructive
discussions, comments, and criticisms. Special thanks are also owed to the participants in
the two workshops that led to the production of this volume, the Oxford Jurisprudence
Discussion Group, as well as the 2011 York University Graduate Student Philosophy
conference where this paper was presented as a keynote address.
1

For example, in his recent book on The Constitutional State (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010) 131, NW Barber writes that ‘A state which enters into an unjust war in a
climate of moral panic is, all other things being equal, less reprehensible than a state
which enters into that same war whilst fully aware of its injustice’. For an argument
assuming the availability of at least some excuses for domestic state wrongdoing, see eg
T Sorell, ‘Morality and Emergency’ (2003) 103 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
21, 33-34.
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including its relationship with the wider question of when the state may
legitimately be singled out to bear adverse normative consequences for
wrongdoing. I say that my aim is limited to ‘mapping out’ the topic
because I believe that an important first step in understanding state
excuses is to identify properly the many complex and controversial
theoretical puzzles they raise.
In a bid to remain ecumenical, I will adopt a wide understanding of
excuses that comprises the core pleas which, for right or for wrong, have
sometimes been treated as excuses in recent theoretical debates about
individual responsibility in morality and law. By that, I mean claims that
although a given course of conduct was, all things considered, wrong, it
was not blameworthy—or was less blameworthy, in the case of a partial
excuse—because it was (1) ‘justified’ or ‘warranted’ from the epistemic
perspective of the actor, (2) reasonably motivated by reasonable emotions
or other understandable cognitive or affective attitudes, (3) nonresponsible, or (4) a hybrid of two or more of these claims. Of course,
there are important differences between these four types of claims. In fact,
some think of these differences as being so salient that they exclude the
first type of claim from the category of excuses altogether and reclassify it
as justificatory. Others, who argue that excuses are primarily reasonsbased and responsibility-affirming, would differentiate the third type of
claim, and perhaps some instances of the fourth, as claims of ‘exemption’
from responsibility or ‘denial of responsibility’ simpliciter. While these
reclassifications often track deep and important dissimilarities, 2 they
remain contentious. Given the exploratory nature of my project, I avoid
pre-empting meaningful discussion of any possible state excuses by
assuming that restrictive views such as these can simply be transposed,
without argument, onto the domain of state responsibility.
Claims of state justification tend not to elicit the same amount of
suspicion as claims of state excuses. For example, arguments about the
justification of state coercion, state punishment, and state-led warfare
2

I emphasize some of them in relation to individual excuses in F Tanguay-Renaud,
‘Individual Emergencies and the Rule of Criminal Law’ in F Tanguay-Renaud and J
Stribopoulos (eds), Rethinking Criminal Law Theory: New Canadian Perspectives in the
Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational, and International Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2012) 21.
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pervade moral, political, and legal philosophy. Yet, it is not unusual to
find moral and criminal law theorists who, like Andrew Simester, maintain
that excuses ‘are simply inapplicable to artificial actors such as the state.’ 3
This assumption is also deeply entrenched in other legal fields concerned
with the regulation of state wrongdoing. For example, Alan Brudner writes
that, while they may be justified in infringing rights, ‘States cannot be
constitutionally excused for violating rights’. 4
Such brisk rejections of state excuses are intriguing, especially
given the fact that the law of several oft-theorized jurisdictions provides
for blame and even punishment of the state and state organs for
wrongdoing. For example, the Criminal Code of Canada makes clear that
‘municipalities’ and other ‘public bodies’ may, like private organizations,
be held responsible and punished for criminal wrongdoing. 5 In the context
of some civil actions, public authorities may also be subjected to punitive
damages. 6 The constitutional context is no exception. Admittedly,
constitutional law continues to be primarily understood in terms of the
regulation of the legal validity of exercises of state powers, rather than in
terms of the regulation of state wrongdoing, as evidenced by the remedies
usually granted for rights violations—that is, legal invalidity and
procedural remedies such as exclusion of evidence or stay of proceedings.
That being said, state constitutional wrongdoing is regularly condemned
and may even be punished. For example, punitive damages are sometimes
3

AP Simester, ‘Necessity, Torture and the Rule of Law’ in VV Ramraj (ed), Emergencies
and the Limits of Legality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 289, 300.

4

A Brudner, ‘Excusing Necessity and Terror: What Criminal Law Can Teach
Constitutional Law’ (2009) 3 Crim L and Philosophy 147, 148 (Emphasis in the original).

5

Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-46, ss 2, 22.1, 22.2. Here, Canada is not alone. See eg SP
Green, ‘The Criminal Prosecution of Local Governments’ (1994) 72 North Carolina L
Rev 1197 and N Kyoto, ‘Criminal Liability of Corporations – Japan’ in H de Doelder and
K Tiedemann (eds), Criminal Liability of Corporations (The Hague: Kluwer, 1996) 275,
283. Other jurisdictions are more hostile to holding state bodies criminally responsible.
Consider, for example, France (Code pénal, s 121-2) and the Netherlands (see R de
Lange, ‘Political and Criminal Responsibility’ (2002) 6(4) Electronic J of Comparative L
s 7 <http://www.ejcl.org/64/art64-18.html>).
6

See eg Criminal Liability and Proceedings Act RSC 1985 c C-50, ss 17-18 (Canada).

4

deemed an ‘appropriate and just remedy’ for egregiously unjustified
violations of rights under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. 7 At the level of international law, the possibility of criminally
censuring and punishing states for wrongdoing has often been
contemplated and defended over the years, even if the legal status of
‘international crimes of state’ remains uncertain. 8 Be that as it may,
condemnation of state behaviour in United Nations resolutions, as well as
through diplomatic channels, is a commonplace. Last but not least,
popular and political indictments of states and state bodies as
‘wrongdoers’ or ‘criminal’ abound, as do philosophers’ characterizations
of such entities as moral agents susceptible of moral censure for wrongful
deeds. 9
Of course, the questions of whether and how the state may
legitimately be blamed or punished for wrongdoing, as well as what
understandings of ‘the state’ render such inquiries intelligible, require

7

See eg Crossman v The Queen (1984) 9 DLR (4th) 588 (Federal Court, Trial Division);
Patenaude v Roy (1988), 46 CCLT 173 (Superior Court of Quebec); Freeman v West
Vancouver (District) (1991), 24 ACWS (3d) 936 (Supreme Court of British Columbia).
8

The concept of state responsibility for international crimes gained support following the
First World War, but was pushed back into the background by the development of the
principle of individual criminal responsibility under international law after the Second
World War. For an argument that international crimes of state are currently on the
threshold between lex ferenda and lex lata, see NHB Jørgensen, The Responsibility of
States for International Crimes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). For a forceful
defense of the intelligibility and legitimacy of state criminalization in international law,
see D Luban, ‘State Criminality and the Ambition of International Criminal Law’ in T
Isaacs and R Vernon (eds), Accountability for Collective Wrongdoing (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011) 61.
9

In respect of the state considered as a whole, recall Hannah Arendt’s writings on the
acts of Adolf Eichmann: ‘crimes of this kind were and could only be, committed under a
criminal law and by a criminal state.’ H Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the
Banality of Evil (New York: Viking Press, 1963) 240. Consider also claims, like John
Gardner’s, that ‘States are moral agents too…The state must not murder or be complicit
in murder. It must not rape or be complicit in rape. It must not rob or be complicit in
robbery…The state is also bound, even in its exercises of authority and its uses of
coercion, by the general principles of morality that bind us all.’ J Gardner, ‘Prohibiting
Immoralities’ (2006) 28 Cardozo L Rev 2613, 2628.
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further investigation in their own right. 10 In this chapter, though, I start
with the assumption that at least some of the practices of blame and
punishment listed above are legitimate and target entities which detractors
of state excuses would, or should, themselves readily incorporate in their
understanding of the state.
The question then becomes what reasons there may be for thinking
that exculpatory claims of excuses—as opposed to, say, claims of
justification—are unavailable to the state and, thus, should not be
recognized. First, it bears acknowledging that some do not share my
working assumption, and believe that whatever the state does is
necessarily justified. Therefore, they argue, the question of state excuses
never arises. This position finds both moral and legal instantiations. At the
moral level, some equate the state with the justified pursuit of the public
interest and characterize as private, or non-state, any actions that depart
from it. At the legal level, the argument tends to be that the state is no
more and no less than a (domestic) legal system, such that no deed can be
attributed to it at the domestic level unless that deed is legally authorized
or permitted in some way—for example, through the recognition of a legal
justification. Such challenges to the intelligibility of unjustified state
wrongdoing and, thus, to the possibility of state excuses are, in my view,
exceedingly myopic. As I argue elsewhere, they fail to give sufficient
consideration to the complexity of what many modern states’ socio-legal
constitutions enable them to do, sometimes in defiance of morality or
extralegally. They also fail to give adequate attention to existing practices
of moral and legal censure for behaviour that can be said, to some
meaningful extent, to be organizationally programmed by the state. 11 What
is more, they tend to ride roughshod over many important puzzles related
to what specific justifications should be afforded (or not) to the state for
prima facie wrongdoing. Thus, I mostly disregard such contentions here.

10

I seek to make some progress in addressing these underexplored questions in F
Tanguay-Renaud, ‘Criminalizing the State’ (2012) Crim L and Philosophy (forthcoming).
11

See ibid, as well as F Tanguay-Renaud, ‘The Intelligibility of Extralegal State Action:
A General Lesson for Debates on Public Emergencies and Legality’ (2010) 16 Legal
Theory 161.

6

I say ‘mostly,’ because there may still be a methodological lesson
to be drawn from such challenges. As I suggested above, even if we accept
that unjustified state wrongdoing is intelligible, there remains an important
debate to be had about how it can best be explained. Should we think of
states, and state bodies or institutions, as real and irreducible moral agents
who, like individual human agents, can perpetrate wrongs and, possibly,
also claim excuses for themselves? Or should we instead concede that
wrongdoing states are no more than fictions to which the conduct, wrongs,
blameworthiness and, perhaps, excuses of certain human agents may
legitimately be attributed? This controversy about the nature of the state
and state responsibility is not new in moral and legal theory circles, and
parallels in many ways debates about the responsibility of organizations
more generally. 12 As I indicated earlier, I cannot get to the bottom of this
controversy here. Yet, I can also not ignore it completely, given its
undeniable relevance to the question of whether and how we should think
of state excuses. Therefore, in sections B and C below, I will appraise the
plausibility of state claims of excuses in terms of both of these leading
paradigms, and suggest that some such claims are indeed consistent with
both. Note, however, that since excuses, as I understand them, are
primarily rebuttals of blameworthiness, since the core case of blame is
blame that has a blameworthy moral agent as its direct object, and since
the attribution of blameworthiness to, and blaming of, a posited fiction is
at best a non-standard case, 13 I will consider the realist paradigm first, and
the fiction paradigm second. Note further that, in both cases, I will
primarily focus on the possibility of state excuses in morality. While my
arguments will also often bear directly on the possibility of state excuses
in law, and while I will sometimes even explicitly discuss legal excuses, I
12

For a useful survey of such general debates, see P Cane, Responsibility in Law and
Morality (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) 143-171.

13

I take this understanding of the core case of blame and blameworthiness to be broadly
accepted amongst theorists, irrespective of whether they consider blame to be primarily
an evaluative, punitive, or relations-adjusting practice. See eg TM Scanlon, Moral
Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2008)
128, 160-166; J Gardner, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of
Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 227; G Sher, In Praise of Blame
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 114; J Glover, Responsibility (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970) 44.
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wish to leave open for further consideration the question of whether moral
excuses should always be given legal effect.
With such caveats in mind, let me ask again: assuming that
wrongdoing can be attributed to the state in some way or the other, and
that the state can be morally, criminally, constitutionally, or internationally
blamed and, perhaps even, punished for it, why should excuses be
unavailable to it? Objections are typically of two kinds. Some are
metaphysical. They rest on the assumption that excuses reflect profoundly
human characteristics and are, therefore, unavailable to organizations such
as states and institutional state bodies. Other objections are moral and hold
that, even if the state and its institutional organs are entities that can
invoke excuses, such claims should not be recognized given the moral
position of the state. In what follows, I discuss objections of both kinds.
It is worth noting, at this stage, that many objections of the first
type, and perhaps also some of the second, may be aimed at organizations
more generally, and not only at the state and its corporate organs.
Accordingly, my inquiry will also be of relevance to the question of
whether organizations, considered as a class, can intelligibly and
legitimately make excuses. 14 I choose to focus on the state, however, out
of concern that organizations such as private companies with more
restricted constitutional aims and purposes and more constrained means of
action may not as persuasively or generally be subject to blame qua
irreducible agents—the first paradigm to be investigated. 15 I am also of the
14

The question of the availability of excuses to non-state organizations, such as private
corporations, is also notoriously under-theorized. Some theorists assume that
corporations can simply ‘mak[e] use of any available general excuses’. See J Horder,
Excusing Crime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 262. However, most leading
theorists of corporate responsibility simply ignore the topic altogether. See eg C Wells,
Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); B
Fisse and J Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993). Such broad-brush approaches are manifestly
unsatisfactory given, on the one hand, the existence of widespread regimes of corporate
criminal liability that beg the question of the availability of excuses to corporations and,
on the other, the many objections of the types leveled against state excuses that extend to
corporate excuses generally.
15

Part of my concern is shared by TM Scanlon, who writes that ‘The possibility of
blaming collective agents seems clearest when one moves away from entities such as
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view that state excuses call for a discussion of further interesting moral
objections that do not apply, or do not apply with the same force, to other
organizations. That said, it is my hope that, insofar as my analysis is
applicable to other organizations, the reader will be inclined to employ it,
mutatis mutandis, to elucidate the intelligibility and legitimacy of their
excuses.
B. EXCUSING THE STATE QUA IRREDUCIBLE MORAL AGENT?
1 Philip Pettit’s Model of Corporate/State Agency
An increasing number of contemporary theorists conceive of the state as a
kind of corporate (group, collective—I use these terms as synonyms)
organization that can itself be a moral agent. How can this be if, according
to the time-honoured objection, corporate organizations have no
discernible bodies or minds of their own? The argument tends to rest on
the assumption that some groups of interacting human beings can be
relatively autonomous agents—that is, that they can form action-directing
attitudes such as intentions, develop plans, and perform concerted actions,
that cannot be fully reduced to those of their members—thanks at least in
part to the operation of a normative framework. Modern states, which are
made-up of various institutional organs themselves reliant on the agency
of countless individuals whose identity changes over time, 16 are often
thought to fall in this category, alongside other similarly integrated
corporate bodies. These states all have a constitution that constitutes and
divides labour between their various organs, lays out principles of
governance, and institutes authoritative decision-making, control, and
review mechanisms. By jointly committing and adhering to this
soap companies to collective agents that purport to be guided by noncommercial aims,
and when one considers blame by individuals whose relation to these agents is something
closer than that of consumer and producer.’ Scanlon, Moral Dimensions (n 13) 165.
16

What individuals are comprised in the corporate organization of the state can be a
matter of controversy. John Rawls picks up on one aspect of this debate when he
distinguishes between ‘states, as traditionally conceived’ and ‘liberal democratic peoples
(and decent peoples).’ While the latter necessarily include ordinary citizens in the
organizational unit of evaluation, the former may not. J Rawls, The Law of Peoples
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999) 23-30.
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constitution to a reasonable extent, individual members allow their state
qua corporate entity to form judgments and exhibit attitudes as a coherent
whole, and to make reasonably consistent decisions over time on the
evaluative propositions (including moral and legal reasons) that they
present to it for consideration. Individual members also enable their state
to execute its decisions by complying with constitutionally-adopted action
plans—in the form of rules, practices, directives, and commands—devised
to implement them.
The thought, then, is that modern states often have what it takes to
be moral agents proper. Like other moral agents, they are regularly
confronted with normatively significant choices, involving the possibility
of doing right or wrong. Through the intercession of their individual
members, they may also have the understanding and access to evidence
necessary for making normative judgments about these choices, as well as
the capacity to implement them in the world. Crucially, though, as I imply
above, if they are to count as moral agents in their own right, states qua
corporate organizations must also have the required control over the said
judgments. That is, they must be able to judge and plan for action in ways
that are irreducible to the judgments and plans of other agents, including
those of their members. To see how this is possible, Philip Pettit’s recent
account of group agency is most helpful. Pettit’s account remains one of,
if not the, most careful and sophisticated account of irreducible group
agency to date, and it is also one of the only such accounts to be quite
transparently applicable to complex groups like states. 17 As a result, I use
17

See especially P Pettit, ‘Responsibility Incorporated’ (2007) 117 Ethics 171, and P
Pettit, ‘The Reality of Group Agents’ in C Mantzavinos (ed), Philosophy of the Social
Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009) 67, 89. It is important to acknowledge that many of Pettit’s
insights were developed in collaboration with Christian List, as made clear in their recent
comprehensive restatement of the argument in C List and P Pettit, Group Agency: The
Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011). However, since the separate articles on which I rely most were authored by Pettit
himself, I keep referring to him alone, as a shorthand. See also other generally less
developed accounts along similar veins in D Copp, ‘On the Agency of Certain Collective
Entities: An Argument from “Normative Autonomy”’ in P French and HK Wettstein
(eds), Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Shared Intentions and Collective Responsibility,
vol XXX (Boston: Blackwell Publishing, 2006) 194; M Gilbert, Sociality and
Responsibility: New Essays in Plural Subject Theory (Lanham, Md: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2000) ch 8; O O’Neill, ‘Who Can Endeavour Peace?’ in D Copp (ed), Nuclear
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it as the main backdrop for my analysis, with the hope that most of the
general insights I derive from its scrutiny will hold even if specific aspects
of the account end up being refuted in future arguments.
Pettit argues that groups whose judgments depend on the
judgments of more than one individual can be agents insofar as they
respond rationally to their environment on a reasonably consistent basis.
Constitutions facilitate group agency by assigning decisional roles to the
group’s members and setting limits on what they can and cannot do. To
the extent that the group’s constitution provides sufficient constraints
against internal inconsistencies, the group operating under it may then be a
relatively autonomous agent over time (despite deriving all its matter and
energy from its individual human members). Pettit argues that
constitutional constraints are sufficient for a group to be autonomous in
this sense when they ensure that, under normal conditions, reason is
‘collectivized,’ such that majority views do not always prevail and the
group’s attitudes cannot be described as a simple majoritarian function of
the members’ attitudes. In Pettit’s own words: ‘Autonomy is intuitively
guaranteed by the fact that on one or more issues the judgment of the
group will have to be functionally independent of the corresponding
member judgments, so that its intentional attitudes as a whole are more
saliently unified by being, precisely, the attitudes of the group.’ 18 He also
insists that decision procedures must be in place to guarantee that the
group can change and correct its irreducible attitudes over time, so as to

Weapons, Deterrence, and Disarmament (Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol 12,
Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1986) 41; P French, Collective and Corporate
Responsibility (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).
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Pettit, ‘Responsibility Incorporated’ (n 17) 184. Pettit claims that a central case of such
group autonomy obtains when the group’s constitution effectively requires members to
aggregate their judgments on individual premises of decisions, rather than their final
judgments on overall decisions in a simple majoritarian way. He also allows for other
suitable decisional arrangements, including more complex ‘distributed premise-based
procedures’ where different subgroups specialize on judging specific premises. These
conclusions come out primarily of Pettit’s treatment of the well-known discursive
dilemma. See eg C List and P Pettit, ‘Group Agency and Supervenience’ in J Hohwy and
J Kallestrup (eds), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and
Causation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) 75.
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ensure the minimal rational coherence and integrity that we expect of
agents proper.
The claim, then, is that state constitutions often ensure such
relative state autonomy and minimal diachronic rational coherence and
integrity by imposing a variety of balances and checks on state decisionmaking—for example, separation of powers, federal division of powers,
judicial review of administrative and legislative action, stare decisis,
elections, impeachment procedures, and so forth. Depending on how they
are constituted, discrete institutional state organs pertaining to the
executive, legislative, or judicial branch—sometimes at both federal and
state, or provincial, levels—can also be imbued with such relatively
autonomous
agency.
Commonly-discussed
examples
include
municipalities, public corporations, the army, provincial governments,
various administrative agencies, as well as the executive as a whole. 19
When such suitably-constituted group organizations arrange for moral or
legal wrongs to be perpetrated, given the decisions they license and the
constitution by which they channel those decisions, they are fit to be held
responsible and, possibly, blamed for them qua irreducible ‘source of the
deed.’
Focusing on the state as whole for the sake of simplicity, one may
interject here that, even if this account is sound in respect of developed
liberal democratic states, other states may not be sufficiently well
organized to respond rationally to their environment on a consistent basis
qua irreducible corporate agents. How should we think of such states? Are
they states to which a plea of insanity, mental disorder, or straight-out
non-responsibility should be available against allegations of wrongdoing?
I am tempted to answer with a qualified yes. To the extent that they do not
have a sufficiently well-developed constitutional apparatus, or that their
individual members do not commit to and comply with it enough, such
states do not qualify as relatively autonomous moral agents capable of
acting contrary to reason and answering to it. At best, they may be
19

Even if such state organs obviously do not constitute ‘the state’ as a whole, they
typically form significant parts of it, such that consideration of their agency and possible
excuses seems to dovetail with a discussion of state excuses. An explanation of the
precise nature of their connection to ‘the state’—be it legal, conventional, functional, or
otherwise—is outside the ambit of this chapter.
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deficiently-constituted ‘quasi-states,’ whose decisions and actions are, in
general, reducible to the decisions and actions of some of their individual
members. At worse, they are utterly disorganized ‘failed states’ that
possess almost none of the characteristics of what we normally conceive
as states. 20
Here, one may think, lies the main difference with cases of
individual insanity or mental disorder. Even when mentally-disordered
individuals are thoroughly incapable of responding to reason, they, unlike
quasi-states or failed states, remain embodied, identifiable and, in a sense,
irreducible entities. Some may also argue that, as mentally disordered as
they may be, human beings are deserving of a kind of respect and dignity
that is not necessarily warranted, or warranted in the same way, in the case
of degenerate forms of human organization like failed and quasi-states.
There is certainly some truth to this line of argument. However, I still
think the analogy between individual and state insanity can be preserved
to a meaningful extent if we insist that failed and quasi-states can remain
identifiable in some respects—say, territorially and in the eyes of certain
relevant national and international actors—and that, like the mentally
disordered, they might, in some possible world, be ‘cured’ or re-organized
in a way that makes state agency possible. For example, it is conceivable
that, through its own resources and international assistance, the failed state
of Somalia (as we know it today) could one day develop out of its
debilitating predicament. Thus circumscribed, the analogy would also
seem to be applicable to identifiable institutional state organs and other
sub-state corporate entities that lack irreducible agency, yet are susceptible
of reorganization that would make it possible.
Unfortunately, this stretched analogy is only the beginning of our
troubles. The next and more difficult question is whether a model of
irreducible state agency such as Pettit’s can be consistent with claims of
excuses that extend beyond claims of complete lack of responsibility.

20

I borrow this distinction from T Erskine, ‘Assigning Responsibilities to Institutional
Moral Agents: The Case of States and “Quasi-States”’ in Can Institutions Have
Responsibilities?: Collective Agency and International Relations (New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2003) 19, 29-31.
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2 The Challenge of Affect-Based Excuses with a Cognitive Twist
It is sometimes objected that many common individual excuses are
grounded in conscious phenomenal experiences such as affective
experiences and that, since states and corporate state bodies do not have
such experiences of their own, they simply cannot claim these excuses.
Consider the excuse of duress, which Andrew Simester, who champions
this objection, explains in the following terms:
Suppose, for example, that D attacks and seriously injures V
because T threatens otherwise to kill her. Notwithstanding that it
was impermissible for D to act as she did, in the sense that there
were insufficient valid reasons for her conduct, we may be
reluctant to fault D. Our reluctance is because, although D’s reason
for acting was (objectively speaking) inadequate, we can
understand that it was good enough for D. She feared for her life.
Any reasonable person might have been impelled by such a fear;
where this is so, we cannot make the inference of culpability that
would normally entitle us to blame D for her actions. In such cases,
we may allow for an excuse. 21
This affect-based account of the excuse of duress is generally accepted
and, arguendo, I shall assume its soundness. 22 Simester’s objection is that,
since corporate organizations such as the state cannot experience the fear
that is necessary to ground this excuse, it is not available to them. No
doubt, their individual members can experience the required fear, and may
21
22

Simester, ‘Necessity, Torture, and the Rule of Law’ (n 3) 299.

For example, Jeremy Horder writes that ‘All duress cases calling for an excuse have at
least one ascriptive aspect [...] The great phenomenological strength of D’s fear must
alter the balance of reasons in D’s mind, so that he or she understandably gives priority to
saving him- or herself, if need be by committing the wrong in question.’ Horder,
Excusing Crime (n 14) 58. See also Gardner, Offences and Defences (n 13) 110, 138, 258.
There are theorists who think that, in the end, all sound excuses—including all forms of
duress—are grounded in cognitive errors of perception. See eg P Westen, ‘An Attitudinal
Theory of Excuse’ (2006) 25 L and Philosophy 289. I find such arguments unpersuasive
given that some people who are perfectly aware of the wrongfulness of their deeds when
acting under duress may still deserve to be excused if their fear was reasonable and
sufficient to explain their actions (assuming an acceptable level of self-control).
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sometimes be excused for their wrongdoing on that basis, but states and
state bodies qua irreducible corporate agents cannot.
I could not hope to do justice here to the deep and complex
metaphysical question of whether corporate entities like states and state
bodies can have affective experiences and other conscious phenomenal
states of their own. However, some general remarks seem apposite. If
functionalist thinkers like Pettit are right about corporate agency, then
given some plausible empirical claims about states—that they have
decision-making mechanisms, that their decisions can have reasonable
coherence over time, etc.—there seems to be no principled difficulty in
ascribing genuine and irreducible cognitive states to them. According to
such a view, states and other appropriately constituted corporate entities
can quite literally make judgments, acquire beliefs about what they judge
to be the case, intend actions, and so forth. However, the case for
corporate affective states and other phenomenal experiences is more
difficult to make.
Admittedly, there may be emotions, like anger, that arise among
group members (who, by hypothesis, are otherwise never angry) when
they are acting as part of a given group—that is, within the processes and
relationships that constitute it. This anger might then be described as
group, or group-related, anger. However, more needs to be said if the
claim that this anger is irreducible to the anger experienced by individual
members is to be made out. One could perhaps seek to extend the
functionalist argument and claim that phenomenal states are also best
explained functionally. Yet, I find it difficult to imagine how this claim
could be persuasively developed. As Pettit himself recognizes,
functionalist claims that corporate entities have emotions that are
relatively autonomous from those of their individual members are
generally suspect. It is one thing for states and corporate state institutions
to be able to form distinct judgments, beliefs, intentions, and other actiondirecting attitudes by following, to a reasonable extent, whatever steps are
prescribed in their constitution. It seems to be quite another for irreducible
affective states to be generated in a similar way. In other words, there
seems to be more to phenomenal states—say, to the experience of fear or
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anger—than mere questions of organizational structure and function. 23
Accordingly, it is at least plausible that Andrew Simester, who appears to
think that such states are distinctively human (or, at least, animal as
opposed to artificial), is correct.
To be sure, some theorists do defend the possibility of irreducibly
collective emotions. However, their arguments tend to rest on the dubious
premise that emotions can exist without affective experience. Thus,
Margaret Gilbert, the most prominent advocate of collective emotions,
adopts early on in her argument Martha Nussbaum’s claim that some
emotion-types may have no necessary phenomenal concomitant, citing the
non-conscious fear of death as an example. 24 Besides the fact that the
existence of non-conscious, non-affective emotional states is highly
questionable, it is important to note the difference between the claim that
every emotional state does not necessarily come with a specific and
distinctive affective experience, and the claim that affect can altogether be
absent from emotional experience. While the former claim is admittedly
plausible, the latter is rather more counter-intuitive. It may well be true
that unlike moods, which refer to purer forms of affective experience—
think of free-floating depression, sadness, elation, or euphoria—emotions
also have cognitive components, such as being directed at objects and
23

P Pettit, ‘Akrasia, Collective and Individual’ in S Stroud and C Tappolet (eds),
Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 68,
79. One should be careful when assessing the implications of this proposition. Many
theorists hold that for an agent to be blameworthy and legitimately blamed this agent
must be morally responsible in the sense of being able to respond to reasons. Some
further claim that this ability requires the emotional capacity to be moved by moral
concerns. It follows, they contend, that affect-less corporate organizations can never be
blamed legitimately. See especially S Wolf, ‘The Legal and Moral Responsibility of
Organizations’ in JR Pennock and JW Chapman (eds), Criminal Justice: Nomos XXVII
(New York: New York University Press, 1985) 267. This position rests on an account of
legitimate blame that we need not accept. Pettit, who implicitly resists it, is in good
company in this respect: see eg the literature listed in n 13. Alternatively, let us not forget
that, as Pettit himself recognizes and as I discuss further below, irreducible corporate
organizations may, derivatively, be moved by the emotions of their constituent members.
According to Pettit’s account, individual members remain the ones who introduce
evaluative propositions for group consideration and who, collectively, decide upon them.
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M Gilbert, ‘Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings’ (2002) 6 J of Ethics 115,
119-120, citing M Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (CUP Cambridge 2001) 61.

16

involving beliefs about them. My fear of a dog, for example, does seem to
involve a cognitive construal of a number of the dog’s features (its
salivating maw, its ferocious bark, its running towards me) as frightening.
However, it does not follow that the relevant cognitive aspects of emotions
can altogether be devoid of affective experience. Such a position seems
radically out-of-touch with the phenomenology of emotions, and much
current research has sought to discredit it. 25
Then again, to the extent that affect-free ‘emotional states’ do exist
or, following Nussbaum, that some ‘emotions’ are best explained in purely
cognitive terms—say, as evaluative judgments that ascribe great
importance to certain things or persons—it seems more accurate to treat
them generically alongside other cognitive states, rather than as part of a
distinctive emotional genre. Indeed, insofar as an ‘emotion’ is best
explained as a mere configuration of beliefs or as a cognitive attitude, I see
no reason not to label it and treat it as such. To repeat, according to an
account such as Pettit’s, suitably-constituted states and state institutions
can have cognitive states (such as beliefs) and action-directing attitudes
(such as intentions) of their own. It is phenomenal states, such as affective
states, they cannot experience. 26
Does this view entail that states cannot claim excuses grounded in
their own affective experiences? The conclusion seems to follow, and
follow as much in the realm of domestic law as in the realms of
25

See eg M Stocker, Valuing Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996);
LC Charland, ‘Reconciling Cognitive and Perceptual Theories of Emotions: A
Representational Proposal’ (1997) 64 Philosophy of Science 555; J Pankseep, Affective
Neuroscience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); P Greenspan, Emotions and
Reason: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification (New York: Routledge Chapman and
Hall, 1988). For an even more radical argument, advocating a close identification of
emotions with feelings: P Goldie, The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000).
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Insofar as conative attitudes such as wishing, desiring, longing, or craving have
phenomenal components, it may also be that corporate agents cannot have them, or can
only have them partially. Pro-attitudes devoid of phenomenal components are more
straightforwardly available to corporate agents. In this respect, intentions and other
cognitively-defined pro-attitudes are least problematic. I thank Antony Duff for pressing
me on this point.

"

17"
"
international law and morality writ large. Note, however, that even if
states and corporate state institutions cannot claim affect-based excuses—
or, more broadly, excuses grounded in their own phenomenal
consciousness—they may still be able to claim excuses that are derivative
from the phenomenal experiences of their individual members. Remember
that, even if the account of group agency on which I am basing my
analysis is an account of relatively autonomous group agency, it is still
individual group members who supply all its matter and energy. So, for
example, it is a state’s individual members who introduce information and
option-related evaluative propositions for its consideration. Insofar as the
information and propositions thus introduced are distorted by, say, the fear
experienced by the individuals introducing them, state judgments and
intentions formed on their basis may turn out to be mistaken. Arguably,
the greater and the more widespread the fear experienced by the
members—which, in a liberal democracy, may include not only officials,
but a large part of the citizenry—the likelier it is that their affective
experience will influence state decision-making and cause corporate
errors.
Consider, for example, the effect that the deep and widespread fear
of sudden murderous attacks—which exists amongst important segments
of Israel’s general population and state officials—might have on state
decisions. All else being equal, could this fear excuse, at least partially,
some of Israel’s harshest reactions, as well as some of the unjustified
reactions of specific governmental and defense institutions, to events that
do not constitute threats but are collectively perceived as such? All else
being equal, could the dread of terrorist strikes that prevailed in the US
after the events of September 11, 2001, at least partially excuse some of
the state’s legally and morally wrongful and unjustified responses—
including indefinite pre-emptive detentions of both adults and children at
Guantanamo Bay, official sanction and perpetration of degrading forms of
treatment as means of interrogation, as well as unwarranted invasive
military campaigns? At one point in his brief discussion of state excuses,
Simester seems to open the door to this possibility by qualifying his
argument, and recognizing that it might just be possible for states to
invoke epistemic mistakes as excuses for wrongdoing. ‘Epistemic
mistake,’ he writes, is ‘a quite different type of case.’ 27
27
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Although Simester does not explain this statement any further, one
important distinction is readily identifiable. Unlike duress, epistemic
mistake is a cognition-based, as opposed to an affect-based, ground of
exculpation. If, indeed, states and corporate state bodies can have
cognitive abilities, they too may sometimes fall prey to epistemic failures
and, thus, are vulnerable to making mistakes. Beyond what Simester
recognizes, they may also fall prey to more radical distortions grounded in
irresistible ignorance, as well as in other non-belief-based cognitive
attitudes. Even more importantly for our immediate purposes, though,
what Simester fails to acknowledge is that the factors that can cause state
cognitive distortions not only include individual epistemic limitations—
such as misleading or unavailable evidence—and other purely cognitive
failings, but also phenomenological distortions experienced by individual
members. In other words, when it comes to states and other irreducible
corporate agents, cognitive distortions may not always be entirely
cognitive. For example, affective distortions of the practical rationality of
individual members may sometimes lie at the root of their corporate
organization’s cognitive failings. In this sense, it might sometimes be
possible to speak of states and corporate state institutions that act while
being ‘blinded by fear’ or ‘blinded by anger’ and then seek to be excused
on that ground, with the proviso that the fear or anger in question is the
fear or anger of their individual members. The same could also be said of
states and state institutions acting in the grip of the (popular) mood of the
moment.
Of course, this argument does not amount to a claim that Israel, the
US, or any of their institutions should be excused for their unjustified
wrongs on the ground of affectively-induced epistemic mistakes. What it
does, however, is to elucidate further some key intricacies of cognitive
distortion as a conceivable ground of excuse for them.
3 Some Sui Generis State qua Corporate Excuses?
These last remarks warrant a parenthetical note of methodological caution.
The analysis as I have conducted it so far assumes that commonlyencountered individual excuses constitute the standard against which the
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intelligibility of excusatory claims by group agents should be assessed. In
other words, my argumentative strategy has so far been to think of excuses
in terms of commonly-encountered individual excuses—such as duress,
provocation, and mistake in justification—and ask whether such claims
are also available to irreducible group agents. Insofar as these agents have
what it takes to claim such excuses—and they may not, as in the case of
affective experiences—I see no reason why we should not, at least in
principle, recognize their possibility (or so I will continue to assume).
Then again, my remarks at the end of the last section highlight the fact that
irreducible group agents form a special category of agents. Unlike
individual agents, their existence and agency depend on, yet are
irreducible to, the existence and agency of other (individual) agents.
Doesn’t this constitutional difference warrant a distinct, or perhaps more
complex, approach to understanding at least some conceivable claims of
group excuses? I think it might.
What it means for individuals to act appropriately qua ordinary
individuals may differ from what it means for them to act appropriately
qua members of a group agent, or so they may think or feel. While full
commitment of individual members to the group, its constitutional
operation, as well as its rational coherence and integrity over time, may
ensure that the group behaves in the fashion of a virtuous agent, various
members may sometimes be moved, for good or bad reasons, to act in less
than committed ways. They may, for example, temporarily turn their eyes
away from the group in order to act fairly, charitably, or humanely qua
individuals, or because of affective distractions, or simply because of
selfish or biased inclinations. When this happens, the group may not act in
the minimally rationally consistent way that we would expect of an agent
proper. 28 Indeed, such lapses may even put the status of the group as an
irreducible agent in jeopardy. At the same time, notice that they may not
challenge this status to the same extent as more fundamental structural
deficiencies may, as we saw, generate failed or quasi-states.
Consider the case of the United States’ failure to join the League of
Nations in the 1920s. Although its president at the time, Woodrow Wilson,
28

A minimum of rational coherence and integrity also seems necessary for individual
human moral agency, even if the required threshold likely falls well short of perfection.
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led an American charge for the League’s creation and ensured that its
constitutional covenant—contained in the Treaty of Versailles—would be
crafted in a way that assumed US membership and leadership, the US
Senate refused to ratify the treaty and, therefore, to join the organization.
This senatorial rejection, primarily attributable to the opposition of a
number of ideologically uncompromising Republican members, sowed the
seeds for the League’s collapse, which culminated in its inability to
prevent the Axis Powers’ aggressions that led to World War II. 29 Could
Wilson, acting in the name of the United States, have claimed an excuse
for his state’s harmful volte-face by invoking the erratic character of the
US’s dualist system of reception of international treaty law—which
involves negotiation and signature of treaties by the Executive, and ex post
facto ratification by Congress? In other words, if a state (or other
irreducible group agent) is imperfectly organized in a way that facilitates
rational inconsistency of the sort just exemplified, could such a
constitutional disorder ground an excuse?
The question is tantalizing since such organizational deficiencies,
coupled with individual members’ lapses in commitment to group rational
integrity, may indeed explain a state’s failure to live up to relevant
behavioural standards. This kind of explanation may be especially forceful
in cases, such as the one just described, where the deficient mode of
organization is inherited from the past and is not easily changed, due to
constitutional restrictions. Pettit claims that groups that fall prey to such
momentary, yet radical failures in rational coherence and integrity can
retain their overall status as irreducible agents. They can do so, he argues,
insofar as the bulk of their members remain generally disposed to play
their part in the integration of the group as an agent proper. Such groups
must also ‘prove capable of acknowledging and denouncing the failure
and, ideally, reforming their behavior in the future—or if not actually
achieving reform, at least establishing that the failure is untypical.’ 30 In
circumstances in which a group meets these conditions, Pettit speaks of
rational unity of ‘a second-best sort: a unity that can exist in spite of the
29
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disunity displayed in actual behaviour.’ 31 In respect of my League of
Nations example, it could be argued that the volte-face at issue was
untypical of US behaviour (at the time, at least), and that the US
subsequently made significant efforts to impress upon other international
actors that it should generally be trusted to live up to its representations
and commitments (insofar as it made any). Thus, an exculpatory claim to
the effect that, given its entrenched constitutional ordering, the US could
understandably fail to act as a rationally unified agent in circumstances
like the ones that led to its failure to join the League, is at least
imaginable. Claims of this sort could also conceivably be made by more
discrete state institutions acting within the national sphere.
When, if at all, these claims should be recognized is a further
question. For what are mostly prudential (or strategic) reasons,
international law tends to be reluctant to acknowledge states’ internal
deficiencies as acceptable grounds of exoneration. For example, it is often
said that such an acknowledgement would inevitably lead to undue erosion
of international regimes of state responsibility. However, there is no
absolute moral bar against the invocation of internal deficiencies as
exculpatory grounds. To return to the analogy with individual defenses for
a moment, criminal law sometimes recognizes that people who perpetrate
harmful deeds while having momentarily lost touch with reason might
legitimately be able to deny responsibility for these deeds, either fully or
partially. Consider, for example, the oft-encountered defenses of
automatism and diminished responsibility.
Interestingly, Pettit would likely resist categorizing group claims
of momentary constitutional disorder that make reliable decision difficult
as sheer denials of responsibility. He prefers to think of the group failures
in question in terms of conflicts of ‘inner voices’—that is, the voices of
different members—that are analogous to conflicts between ‘voices of the
heart’ and ‘voices of the head’ that give rise to more reasons-based (and
responsibility-affirming) individual excuses such as normal cases of
duress and provocation. 32 Of course, this kind of analogy between the
31
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On the distinction between denials of responsibility and more reasons-based excuses,
see Gardner, Offences and Defences (n 13) 131-132; RA Duff, Answering for Crime:
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excuses-generating ‘inner voices’ of individuals and groups is bound to be
imperfect. The types of conflicting ‘inner voices’ at play and their role in
promoting or impeding agency undoubtedly differ significantly as between
groups and individuals. However, argues Pettit, insofar as we conceive of
reason as a certain unified sort of pattern, the analogy can be instructive. 33
Notably, it invites us not to overlook the complex role of reason, broadly
understood with all its cognitive and affective components, in group
claims such as claims of excuses other than sheer insanity.
Pettit’s reluctance to analogize too easily cases of group
constitutional disorder and individual denials of responsibility also has the
potential to shed contrasting light on the alluring analogy between
exculpatory pleas of individual infancy and claims that developing states
and state institutions may make in relation to various developmental
hiccups. While normal young human infants are only minimally
responsive to reason, they progressively acquire a more refined
understanding of themselves and their surroundings as they age. The range
of actions for which they are basically responsible—in the sense of being
able to provide rational explanations for them—tends to increase
correspondingly. Thus, many modern juvenile justice systems
appropriately strive, with varying degrees of success, to hold children
responsible only for wrongdoing for which they are basically responsible
in this sense, and to modulate their remedies and sanctions accordingly. 34 I
say that this approach is appropriate since pleas of human infancy are not
claims of conflicting ‘inner voices’ in Pettit’s sense, which may be
amenable to appraisal in light of excusatory standards. They are denials of
responsibility for alleged wrongdoing (at least in the form in which such
wrongdoing is alleged).

Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 284291.
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States and state institutions may also make exculpatory claims of
developmental infancy, yet it is not as clear that all such claims are best
explained as sheer denials of responsibility. Consider, for example, the
predicament of post-Apartheid South Africa where, within a short period
of time, a myriad of people of colour who had previously been excluded
joined the civil service, and started implementing the Interim Constitution.
Although these new state officials were gradually trained and mentored,
and their transitional constitutional framework was progressively fleshed
out, individual inconsistencies and mistakes were initially bound to take
place, resulting in blunders, slip-ups and, possibly, wrongdoing at the
corporate level. While, in such a case, it is also the group’s capacity to
respond appropriately to reason that is at stake, Pettit teaches us that the
developmental deficiencies in question may not obliterate the group’s
basically responsible agency, and susceptibility to be held responsible and
blamed for its wrongful exercise. To repeat, there remains for Pettit a
‘second-best’ sense of unified, irreducible corporate agency which, in the
face of teething problems, rests on the group’s members persistent and
general commitment to its integration as an irreducibly constituted agent,
as well as on the group’s ex post reaffirmation and readjustment of this
integration. Thus, unlike in cases of individual human infancy, corporate
bodies that are initially unable to respond to reason appropriately due to
developmental hiccups might still at times appropriately be held
responsible and blamed for related wrongdoing. 35 Then again, it is also
conceivable
that
these
groups’
blameworthiness—like
the
blameworthiness of older, more established groups struggling with
constitutional disorders—may sometimes be mitigated, when relevant
excusatory standards of institutional resilience, due diligence, as well as ex
post facto denunciation are met. 36
35
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Here, I am not denying that some states and state institutions with
infant, frail, or limited decision-making structures may sometimes be
basically responsible for some specific actions, while not being basically
responsible for others. 37 Indeed, such teetering reality may be especially
frequent in infant states with constitutional deficiencies that exceed the
mere inability to train officials adequately. In large part, this is because
constitutional structures including agency-enabling balances and checks
such as the separation of powers, the rule of law, parliamentary
democracy, and judicial review take time to develop. As it were, France
and the United Kingdom did not emerge from the state of nature
overnight, and were likely non-responsible for many harms associated
with their evolution. My goal here is simply to point out that there is
almost certainly more to the corporate agency story than this, and that the
possibility of sui generis corporate excuses, differing from common
individual excuses, should not be overlooked. At the same time, the
complex nature of these sui generis claims and the magnitude of the
philosophical apparatus that would be needed to elucidate them fully
prevent me from saying any more here, for fear of losing sight of my
initial goal of mapping out the many theoretical puzzles related to state
excuses. Then again, I think have said enough to build at least a prima
facie case for the intelligibility of group claims of excuses on the ground
of constitutional disorder (short of sheer non-responsibility). I would ask
readers to keep this possibility in mind when thinking about the
constellation of excusatory claims that may be available to irreducible
group agents.
4 The Lack of Valuable Self-Interest Objection to State Excuses
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The categories of ‘quasi-states’ and ‘weak institutions’ are sometimes used to reflect
this possibility. On this point, see T Erskine, ‘Kicking Bodies and Damning Souls: The
Danger of Harming “Innocent” Individuals While Punishing “Delinquent” States’ (2010)
24 Ethics & Intl Affairs 261, 268. As NW Barber argues based on the work of WR Bion
in Experiences in Groups (London: Routledge, 1989), constitutional weaknesses can also
be exacerbated by various state ‘neuroses,’ such as excessive reliance on a leader
(totalitarian or not) and undue fixation on a perceived threat as a source of group
identification and unification. Barber, The Constitutional State (n 1) 117-123.
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Another prominent set of objections to the possibility of state qua
corporate excuses has both metaphysical and moral aspects, which tend to
be run together in argument. According to it, even if we grant that states
have much of what it takes to make excuses—for example, that they are
normally rational agents that can make errors in cognition and perhaps
even undergo some forms of affective experiences—we should still never
recognize their excusatory claims. The general thought is that corporate
agents like states are purely instrumental creations that have no real
interests or subjective values of their own. Insofar as they do—after all,
the paradigm of corporate agency explored allows for irreducible group
judgments and attitudes about what matters to the group’s survival and
what is important to the realization its constitutional goals—then such
group self-interest and values should never be given weight in law or
morality more generally. Corporate agents exist, or should exist,
exclusively to promote the interests and values of others—that is, of noninstrumental agents like human beings. Therefore, the objection holds, no
recognition should ever be given to their self-interested excusatory claims.
No matter what affective pressures they incur, or what mistakes they
commit, states and state institutions should never be excused for
wrongfully privileging themselves. Nor should they be excused for any
tendency they may have to do so. For example, they should never be
excused under the heading of duress for acting wrongfully due to what
were perceived as overbearing threats to their interests or subjective
values. 38
In my view, the apparent strength of this line of argument comes
primarily from its close affinity with the principle of value individualism,
according to which the worth of the state (and, indeed, of anything else)
must ultimately be appreciated in terms of its contribution to human life
and its quality. If, indeed, it is only human interests and values that matter
(here, some allowance may also be made for interests of other non-human
38

The excuse of duress tends to be explained in terms of self-interest. For example,
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conscious beings), then there seems to be no residual moral space for the
recognition of the so-called interests or subjective values of irreducible
corporate agents. One possible rejoinder might be that value individualism
does not necessarily commit one to a purely instrumentalist view of
corporate agency. If one could demonstrate that corporate agents like
states or state institutions are intrinsically valuable as necessary
constituents of goods that intrinsically enrich human life, then some
limited recognition and protection of ‘their interests’—or of their natural
tendency to protect their interests—could, perhaps, be warranted (for
example, in the form of excusatory concessions for state wrongdoing).
Some have recently mounted spirited arguments in favour of the existence
and value of groups’ irreducible interests along such lines, and it may be
that they are onto something. 39 However, powerful objections—
questioning the metaphysical soundness of such arguments and the
acceptability of their possible moral implications—continue to dominate
current debates, and invite great theoretical caution. 40
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What is perhaps a less metaphysically doubtful and morally
hazardous way of challenging the interest objection to corporate excuses is
to cast doubt on another assumption that underlies it. I am referring here to
the assumption that claims of excuses can be reduced to calls for moral or
legal leniency for agents who wrongfully, though understandably,
disregard the interests of others in order to protect their own. I believe that
this assumption is unwarranted. It is simply untrue that valid excuses can
only arise in the context of dilemmas between self-interest and the
interests of others, where the wrongdoer is deemed to have stricken a
balance between the two that is sufficiently virtuous to block or attenuate
inferences of blame. Many excuses have nothing to do with self-interest,
so that the question of whether or not corporate entities like states and
state bodies have interests of their own is often quite irrelevant to their
ability to make such claims legitimately.
It is true that some claims of excuses, such as those relying on
sufficient display of courage in the face of coercive threats, may be
connected to questions of self-interest. As Aristotle once dramatized it,
using the example of the citizen who risks being killed on the battlefield
for the sake of his homeland, courage is a virtue of character that tends to
arise out of a struggle between personal safety and external considerations,
such as collective victory. 41 However, not all displays of virtue that may
yield legitimate claims of excuses have the same structure. For example,
loyalty, which the state may invoke in a bid to excuse wrongfully
favouring citizens over non-citizens, is a virtue that, at its core, is otherregarding. In my view, a theory of morality that would only account for
dilemmas between the pursuit of self-interest and the pursuit of the
interests of others, exclusively allowing for excuses in such contexts,
would be radically deficient. As the example of loyalty highlights,
dilemmas of moral life can also arise between different ways of engaging
with pursuits that have others’ valuable interests at their heart, and valid
claims of excuses might well be made in such contexts as well. Moreover,
some claims of excuses have very little, if anything, to do with questions
of interests writ large. Think, for example, of claims of epistemic mistake,
constitutional disorder, or claims more akin to full or partial denials of
41
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responsibility (insofar as they are appropriately categorized as excuses).
Thus, even if one concedes that states, like other corporate bodies, have no
valuable interests of their own, state excuses must not necessarily be ruled
out as a possibility. The range of available grounds of state excuses may
then differ from the range of available grounds of individual excuses, as
may the range of available grounds of corporate excuses in general, but
this should not be taken to mean that states, or other irreducible corporate
entities, may never make valid excuses.
5 Questioning the Irreducible Corporate Agency Model and RelatedExcusatory Claims
A more sweeping moral objection to state excuses, understood as excuses
claimed by states or state institutions qua irreducible corporate agents,
denies the very necessity for such excuses in the first place. Such excuses
are thought to be unnecessary since practices consisting in holding
corporate agents responsible for wrongdoing and, say, blaming and
punishing them for it, are morally redundant. According to this line of
objection, both the moral and legal regulation of human actions, be they
individual or collective, and practices of accountability for wrongdoing
can and should be articulated in exclusively individualistic terms. That is,
insofar as we understand grounds and practices of moral and legal
accountability for wrongdoing in suitably complex and nuanced ways—
allowing for sufficiently broad accounts of complicitous and joint
wrongdoing—the possibility of holding irreducible groups responsible,
blaming them, and punishing them really becomes superfluous. 42 Thus,
the question of whether irreducible group agents can invoke excuses turns
out to be moot.
One possible rejoinder is as follows: an account of irreducible
group agency like Pettit’s has the advantage of providing a distinct ground
for holding groups such as states and their corporate institutions
responsible and blaming them—say, because their actions made harm
likely or inevitable—at times when no similar ground is available for
42
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holding individual contributors responsible and blaming them. This kind
of shortfall of individual responsibility may arise when, for example,
individual contributors to state action avoid being held responsible and
blamed for their deeds owing to reasonable mistakes or ignorance, due
care, duress, or other relevant excuses. Practices of state qua irreducible
group responsibility may guard against such scenarios, as well as diminish
the incentive for people to arrange things so as to increase their likelihood.
Here, one may be tempted to retort that, even if this rejoinder is
sound, it is nevertheless self-defeating. Indeed, if the state can be excused
for its wrongs when its individual members are excused for their own
wrongful contributions, aren’t shortfalls of responsibility unavoidable? I
believe that this worry is largely unwarranted. First, excusable individual
contributions to state action do not necessarily entail excusable state
behaviour, and vice-versa. For example, it is not because specific
individual state members act mistakenly or under duress that their state or
corporate state institution will necessarily act mistakenly. Multiple checks
and balances are typically in place to reduce the likelihood of the former
automatically translating into the latter. Grounds of responsibility may
also be different for the state and its members, such that the excuses of one
may have nothing to do with the wrongs of the other.
What is more, in respect of reasons-based excuses such as
epistemic mistake or normal cases of duress or provocation, role-based
considerations must also be factored in. In law as in morality, excusatory
standards often vary according to the roles played by those who claim
excuses. 43 Thus, the standards of excusability applicable to individual state
officials, although possibly more stringent than the standards applicable to
ordinary people, may be nowhere near as stringent as the standards
applicable to given corporate state institutions or, perhaps even more
strikingly, to the state in all its grandeur. States are typically designed and
built to be outstandingly strong and knowledgeable, in order to solve
social problems that individuals and smaller corporate entities acting in
uncoordinated ways are unable to solve—such as the securing of social
order, safety, trust, and the conditions of societal cooperation. They tend
generally Gardner, ‘The Gist of Excuses’ in Offences and Defences (n 13) 121-139,
as well as his ‘Reply to Critics’ 245.
"#!See
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to have access to multiple and often better sources of information than
other social actors (including their members taken individually). They also
tend to have greater resources, authority over many more people, and
more extensive opportunities for contingency planning and training than
other agents. With such attributes come greater responsibilities and greater
(arguably, much greater) expectations of virtue, skill, and reasonableness.
Insofar as the idea of capacity to do otherwise matters to some excuses,
different standards may also be applicable to states and their individual
members in this regard. 44 Therefore, even in situations where all
individual state members are excused for their contributions to state
wrongdoing, the state and its institutions may well not be. Of course, the
possibility of a shortfall of responsibility always remains. However, if I
am correct, such shortfalls are likely to be rare.
Now, it might also be possible to resist the shortfall of
responsibility argument at a more general level by arguing that the
exonerating force of epistemic limitations and other types of pressures
inherent in organizational settings is less significant than has traditionally
been believed. One salient reason for this skepticism is as follows: insofar
as individuals know—or, perhaps, ought to know—that they are
participating in the operation of a group decisional framework that may,
by its very constitutional design, yield bad or harmful outputs, it is
questionable whether they should ever be able to escape consequential
responsibility by invoking the irreducibility of these outputs.
Alternatively, it may be that these individuals should only ever be entitled
to partial excuses that mitigate their blameworthiness for wrongful
participation in collective harm, as opposed to negating it altogether. 45 Of
course, this analysis also leaves open the possibility that there may be
scenarios in which the conduct of no individual contributor to harmful
state action quite amounts to wrongdoing, or only amounts to relatively
insignificant wrongdoing. Yet, if the line of argument just outlined is
sound, the shortfall of individual responsibility argument may not provide
44
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as forceful a case for holding irreducible group agents responsible as some
think it does.
Furthermore, even insofar as the shortfall of responsibility
argument provides a compelling case for group responsibility, including
the possibility of blame and its cognates, some skeptical minds may still
object. They may object that, on any plausible account, conditions for
irreducible group responsibility will be so demanding that many states and
state institutions such as courts, legislatures, ministerial cabinets, and
administrative agencies are unlikely to meet them, or to meet them on any
consistent basis. It cannot simply be assumed, they might insist, that states
and their institutions are agents capable of being held responsible and
blamed in an irreducible sense, like Pettit and others sometimes seem
inclined to do. More radically, some might also advance objections to the
very metaphysical possibility of irreducible group agency and
responsibility, and simply reject accounts such as Pettit’s as misguided.
At this point, one should be careful not to throw the baby with the
bath water. If, indeed, the shortfall of individual responsibility argument is
a valid one, as I think it at least sometimes is, then there will likely remain
considerable pressures—grounded in reasons of deterrence, justice,
expressiveness and symbolism, as well as various other pragmatic
concerns—for practices of group accountability for collectively facilitated
harm that cannot be blamed, in whole or in part, on individual
wrongdoers. Thus, there may sometimes be good reasons to treat the
state—even if only understood as a socio-legal or functional grouping
without irreducible moral agency—as if it could intelligibly and
legitimately be held responsible, blamed, and perhaps even punished, like
a fully-fledged responsible agent. In other words, we may sometimes be
justified in erecting fictions (or, more loosely put, figurative accounts) of
state responsibility and blameworthiness. This may be the case when, for
example, such holdings would have significant expressive value—think of
situations in which there is mass popular support for, or acquiescence to,
unjustified official wrongdoing. Such fictions may also lead to critical
reforms in state members’ behaviour and contribute to forestalling future
misconduct. Such a consequentialist way of thinking about state
responsibility for wrongdoing could conceivably complement, or perhaps
even replace, more robust models such as Pettit’s. Therefore, we must also
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spend some time analyzing the implications of this second paradigm for
the possibility of state excuses.
C. FROM REALISM TO PRAGMATIC FICTION
1 The General Problem
In both law and morality, groups are sometimes treated as agents even
when they are not, and held responsible, blamed, and punished for conduct
and outcomes that are only fictionally ‘theirs.’ 46 A case in point is that of
regimes of corporate criminal liability which rely on doctrines of
identification or vicarious responsibility to hold corporations accountable
and blame them for some of the wrongs and harms perpetrated by their
members, either individually, aggregatively, or jointly. Many such regimes
are premised on the imputation to the corporation of a package,
comprising some designated individuals’ conduct (including their acts and
mental states), that amounts, or is relevantly related to, wrongdoing. Other
such regimes involve the sheer attribution of individuals’ blameworthiness
to the corporation. 47 The question for us is this: insofar as the imputed
conduct or blameworthiness is that of individual human beings who are at
least partially excused for their own deeds, can their individual excuses
ever limit or affect that for which the corporation can legitimately be
blamed and punished?
Indeed, the structure of regimes like the ones just mentioned does
not necessarily preclude the concurrent imputation to the group of related
individual excuses—with all their components, be they cognitive,
46
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affective, etc. Insofar as state institutions such as local governments or
other public bodies are targets of moral blame or criminal liability in this
imputed way, such a structural observation also seems to apply. So does it
to cases in which the state as a whole may, in similar ways, be blamed and
threatened with sanctions, be it in the context of constitutional law,
international law, or morality more generally. That is, the excusatory
claims of individuals whose conduct or alleged blameworthiness is at
stake may conceivably also be imputed to the state and its institutions by
means of fictions.
But should individual excuses be imputed to groups in such ways?
As I indicated at the end of the last section, theorists who think of
collective responsibility, collective blame, and collective punishment as
fictions tend to justify associated practices in pragmatic terms. Christopher
Kutz, for example, argues that such practices can be justified as means of
changing collective behaviour for the better, or as means of expressing
symbolically more significant criticism for the joint perpetration of harm
(than if criticism was solely aimed at individual contributors). 48 Now,
insofar as the attribution of individual excuses to a group can at least
partially exonerate it and, consequently, pre-empt the realization of such
valuable reformative and symbolic ends, it is easy to see why pragmatist
theorists are reluctant to admit that such attribution is ever warranted. 49
Attribution of individual excuses to groups, their thought goes, would
threaten to undermine the very rationale for blaming and punishing them
for the acts of individuals.
The mistake that should not be made here is to assume that the
reasons invoked to justify blaming and punishing groups by means of
fictions always trump countervailing reasons. Admittedly, there will at
times be strong reasons in favour of group accountability, group blame,
and even group punishment for harmful wrongdoing. However, there may
also be significant competing reasons that can defeat these strong reasons.
48
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For example, blaming and punishing groups may stigmatize innocent
individual members and cause them to suffer unfairly. The problem of
unfair dispersion of group blame and punishment has plagued theorists of
collective responsibility for years, and there does not seem to be any easy
cure. To be sure, some think that, in light of the seriousness of the
problem, we should simply refrain from blaming and punishing groups—
and perhaps especially large and complex groupings like states and state
institutions.50 Then again, justice—and, more broadly, morality—may not
demand such a radical conclusion, and attribution to groups of relevant
excuses, in tandem with wrongdoing, might form part of a more nuanced
position that gives due consideration to reasons for blaming and punishing
groups as well as to reasons against it, such as unfair dispersion concerns.
Attribution of individual excuses to groups may also serve important
expressive ends. For example, it may provide a meaningful
acknowledgement that, in certain circumstances, there are duties which
individual group members should not be blamed, or should not suffer, for
failing to discharge either on their own or together. What is more,
imputation of excuses to groups might matter outside the context of
straightforward blame and punishment. At times, such imputation may
suitably mitigate crippling compensatory obligations that befall group
members for the erratic and generally detrimental conduct of a few
individuals acting, in the group’s name, under, say, duress or epistemic
misapprehensions. 51 Or in the case of the declaration of an unjust war,
attribution of excuses to the declaring state may modulate its members’
overall liability to harmful self-defensive action. Of course, all these
50
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claims are controversial and arguments beyond what I can provide here
would be needed to vindicate them, insofar as they can be. That said, I
offer them as plausible candidates of areas in which fictions of group
excuses may play an important role and as provocations for further
theoretical scrutiny.
One of the fiercest opponents of (legal) fictions, Jeremy Bentham,
used to deride them as ‘lies’ that ‘may be applied to a good purpose, as
well as to a bad one: in giving support to a useful rule or institution, as
well as to a pernicious one.’ 52 For Bentham, the only appropriate response
to this ambivalent and rather unpredictable character of fictions was to get
rid of them altogether. However, since fictions of group responsibility can
serve important ends, this remedy seems drastic. A more discerning
position may be to insist that such fictions must always be justified, in the
sense of being deployed for undefeated reasons. As suggested above, it is
at least plausible that imputation of individual excuses to groups,
alongside other elements comprised in the package imputed to them
through doctrines of identification or vicarious responsibility, might on
occasion help ensure that practices of group—and, more to the point,
state—blame, punishment, and their cognates remain so justified.
The point also applies if groups such as states can be irreducible
agents and one asks whether the emotions, moods, interests, and the like,
of their individual members may ever be imputed to them by means of
fiction—in ways that could contribute to grounding claims of group
excuses. Here again, the issue is one of justification. Yet, in the case of the
state, many are reluctant to concede even the very possibility of such
justified fictions given what they perceive as the slipperiness of the
concession. The state is a purely instrumental creature, they claim, and
given its role and position in society, it should embody the epitome of
knowledgeability, self-control, and fortitude. As I claimed in the last
section, there is certainly some truth to this suggestion. But should
states—however we understand them—really always be held to standards
of perfection in reasonableness, skill, and virtue, such that any talk of state
excuses and related talk of state emotions, moods, and interests are really
52
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moot ab initio? Throughout this chapter, I hinted in various ways at my
discomfort with this radical suggestion. In the next section, I, at last, tackle
upfront its most prominent incarnation.
2 The State as an Inexcusable Beacon of Virtue?
A challenging group of objections take aim at the suggestion that states
may legitimately be afforded excuses in situations where their ‘special
relationship’ with, and instrumental value to, their human subjects are at
issue. The thought seems to be that, given the nature of the state as an
entity whose every function and action should be instrumentally tailored to
the well-being of its subjects, such situations are a common place. They
are a common place and give rise to expectations of state virtue that are so
exacting as to create a virtually insurmountable barrier to the legitimate
recognition of state excuses. These objections primarily take issue with the
possibility of domestic state excuses, understood either according to the
irreducibility paradigm or the fiction paradigm, given the deep and
inevitable interplay between a state’s actions and its subjects at the
domestic level. Still, international variants are also conceivable.
A first such objection rests on the fact that not only does the
modern state typically have great resources and opportunities for action, it
also characteristically claims a preeminent social role for itself as wielder
of supreme and legitimate authority over a territory and its occupants. The
objection is that, given such attributes, the state should not only seek to be,
but be expected to be, a model of virtue for all those who live under it,
work on its behalf, or otherwise relevantly cross its path. Indeed, what
standing would it have to guide them, hold them responsible, and
sometimes even blame and punish them were it not to live up to what it
preaches and more? Besides, wouldn’t excusing the state for unjustified
wrongdoing risk creating erroneous perceptions amongst individual state
officials and ordinary subjects that no more is actually expected of them?
Such moral concerns, and there are no doubt many related others, are
undoubtedly deserving of serious consideration. For some, though, they
are so salient as to require holding the state to a standard of virtuous
perfection in its dealings with its subjects. In such contexts, the thought
goes, even if states can face exigent circumstances and, say, undergo
debilitating affective experiences—real or fictionally attributed—they
must always be expected to tower above them, with complete
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equanimity. 53 Therefore, there ought to be no excusatory concessions to
state frailty.
Simester emphasizes a distinct, yet related objection, when he
argues that ‘it is not open for the State, or its officials, to prefer the
interests of one person to another, since the State is not entitled to be
closer to one person than another. It is equidistant, impartial to all.’54
Here, the underlying assumption seems to be that, insofar as states have
valuable interests and personal values, they are expected never to act on
them in their relationships with their subjects. Insofar as they do not have
such interests and values, yet one embraces a conception of morality that
admits of primarily other-regarding dilemmas, such as dilemmas of
loyalty, states are also expected to refrain from engaging in them, once
again in the context of their relationships with their subjects. Accordingly,
even if valid excuses may sometimes be available to individual
wrongdoers in relevantly similar circumstances, such excuses should
never be recognized when invoked by or in the name of the state.
Part of the apparent strength of this last objection derives, in my
view, from the powerful liberal idea that states should administer justice
impartially and impersonally. Were states not to behave in this way,
liberals argue, the very idea of state justice would be severely undermined.
I am sympathetic to this position, which I take to be quite uncontroversial.
However, the administration of justice does not exhaust the activities of
the modern state. States also seek to thwart the spread of diseases and risks
of natural disasters, they make administrative decisions in matters of
taxation, immigration, healthcare and national security, they wage war and
engage in all sorts of other pursuits that are not strictly tied to the
administration of justice. In the context of these further pursuits, could it
not sometimes be excusable for states, state institutions, as well as
officials acting in their name and behalf to be partial on account of
relevant allegiances? For example, whereas it may be morally wrong, all
things considered, to expel illegal immigrants who have resided and
integrated in a state, as well as contributed to it for a long time, is it really
53
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always inexcusable for the state to proceed given significant popular and
political pressures stemming from the citizenry?
Some, like Simester, seem to believe that state partiality is
indefensible at the domestic level, and that states should be expected to
adopt a perfectly impartial and impersonal standpoint in their dealings
with their subjects (or, at least, their citizens). Some strict cosmopolitan
moral theorists endorse an even more far-reaching version of this view,
arguing for stringent duties of justice, respect, and beneficence owed to all
human beings regardless of territorial jurisdiction, social ties, and political
affiliations. These are theorists for whom the objection to state excuses
considered here would likely extend to key international dimensions of
states’ conduct, such as those impinging on the human rights of people
who are outside their jurisdiction and are not their subjects. For example,
such theorists would likely resist the grant of any excuses to states
declaring unjust wars to protect their citizens. This position stands in stark
contrast with that of various particularist and pluralist communitarians of
various stripes who readily reject as unrealistic and unreasonable any such
premise of perfect state impartiality. 55
Who is right? I do not intend to delve at length into this last
debate, nor into the issue of which precise standards of virtue should apply
to states. My intention is rather to draw the reader’s attention to an oftneglected, yet plausible defense of official public attitudes which, despite
being conducive to partiality and lesser equanimity, may be consistent
with a proper, instrumental account of the role and value of the state.
Opponents of state excuses who insist on state impartiality and virtuous
perfection at all times, tend to overlook the strength of such arguments.
Consider the gap that sometimes exists, at both state and non-state
levels, between what I will call the morality of motives and the morality of
actions. For example, take the case of the army officer whose hotheadedness sometimes leads her to be less than impartial, treat many of
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her subordinates harshly, and deal with enemy combatants mercilessly. All
things considered, her hot-headed actions may not always be justified.
However, for army officers in many important roles, such hot-headedness
is a morally desirable attitude. For example, we would not want them to be
such coldfish that they are unable to motivate their troops. Hot-headedness
might also be a condition of their success in battle. In other words, hotheadedness may be instrumental to the realization of some of the
legitimate state purposes that army officers exist to serve qua officials
whose conduct is imputable to the state. I believe that this point also holds
with respect to a wide-range of individual and, possibly, irreducible
corporate attitudes that are crucial to the fulfilment of state functions, yet
can sometimes drive a wedge between morally acceptable thinking about
actions and morally acceptable actions. Think of risk-averseness,
carefulness in planning, dedication to people’s welfare and responsiveness
to their needs, efficiency-mindedness, and so forth.
Conflicts between morally desirable attitudes and right action are a
recurring feature of moral life for both ordinary individuals and states. As
Robert Merrihew Adams pointedly remarks, such conflicts can often be
tragic:
Are there some circumstances in which it is best, for example, in
the true morality of motives, to be unable to bring oneself to
sacrifice the happiness of a friend when an important duty obliges
one, in the true morality of actions, to do so? I don’t know. But if
there are, the interests involved, on both sides, are far from trivial,
and the seriousness of both moralities can be maintained. If one
fails to perform an important duty, one ought, seriously, to feel
guilty; but one could not do one’s duty in such a case without
having a motivation of which one ought, seriously, to be ashamed.
The situation presents a tragic inevitability of moral disgrace. 56
I take part of the point of the previous passage to be that some breaches of
duty—that is, some wrongs—may not be justified, all things considered,
even when perpetrated out of friendship. However, in some contexts, the
willingness to stand up for a friend even in the face of conflicting duty
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may still be reasonable. If not necessarily admirable, it may well be
understandable. Common claims of excuses take hold in such instances of
wrongdoing that stem from understandable motivations. 57 When
appropriate standards of virtue are met, such claims may well be
legitimately recognized. Insofar as they are grounded in motivations that
are instrumental to legitimate state functions, they may also be
appropriately imputed to the state in tandem with other aspects of
individual behaviour with which it is identified. Of course, if states and
state institutions do not have personal values, interests, or conscious
phenomenal experiences of their own qua irreducible group agents, not all
types of motivations that may lead to valid individual excuses may be
available to them under that specific understanding of state responsibility.
Yet, at the very least, it seems to me that states and state institutions so
understood may have reasonable cognitive attitudes or inclinations that are
defensible as instrumental to their proper functions. Such attitudes may
play a significant part in shaping their motivations for action and,
sometimes, open the door to valid claims of state excuses for wrongdoing.
Again, I am not denying that many excusatory standards to be
applied to states and state institutions qua irreducible agents, or to officials
whose conduct is imputed to the state, should, as a matter of course, be
demanding. This conclusion seems to follow from the special social
position of the state vis-à-vis its subjects and its typically greater
resources, authority, and general opportunities for action. Yet, I remain
unconvinced that such features necessarily translate into excusatory
standards of virtuous perfection for states and that, unlike for individuals,
no excusatory recognition should ever be given to their understandable
distortions in judgment, either at the domestic or international level. After
all, states are collectives of individuals and, therefore, it seems that our
expectations of them must at least partly depend on expectations that we
have of these individuals acting together.
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To be sure, it seems to me that we could plausibly conceive of
different excusatory standards of virtue applicable to different realms and
types of state activity, with the most stringent perhaps applicable to state
activities that impinge most severely on basic human rights. We could also
plausibly conceive of different excusatory standards applicable to the
state’s domestic as opposed to international incarnations, to the state as a
whole as opposed to discrete state institutions, to different such
institutions, to states and state institutions at different stages of
development, to state institutions as opposed to private corporations or
individuals discharging state functions, and so forth. Likewise, even if the
state should be expected to be expertly knowledgeable about certain
things, excusatory standards for epistemic mistakes may well vary
between domains of activity. Indeed, in some such domains, liberal
restrictions on what the state should know, and seek to know, may
themselves be quite stringent. As discussed in previous sections, different
kinds of excusatory grounds such as complete or partial lack of basic
responsibility, the modulating potential of group excuses for concerns
associated with group blame and punishment, and valuable symbolism,
may also warrant the recognition of at least some state excuses. None of
these grounds of excuse are virtue-driven and, like in the case of epistemic
mistake and constitutional disorder, they have nothing to do with the
permissibility of state partiality. Thus, the possibility of legitimate
excusatory concessions to the state may well not be as unthinkable as
many believe.
D. CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have sought to highlight central theoretical puzzles
related to the question of whether state claims of excuses may ever be
intelligible and, if so, legitimately recognized. The arc of my argument has
been that even if the range of excuses available to the state does not
overlap neatly with excuses available to ordinary individuals, excuses may
indeed be morally available to states. For some, my argument may raise
the spectre of murderous, torturing, or otherwise wicked states being
offered unconscionable paths to absolution. I disagree. What my argument
does, or at least attempts to do, is to expose the challenge of state excuses
for what it is, so that it must be addressed in all its complexity and not
simply wished away. Of course, much work remains to be done to
determine the appropriate grounds, precise internal structure, and apposite
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standards of virtue and skill for specific state excuses, in specific contexts.
A more refined understanding of the state, its functions, its susceptibility
to holdings of moral and legal responsibility, blame, and punishment,
perhaps developed in comparison with other social actors such as private
corporations, would likely assist with this multifaceted task. So might
closer scrutiny of the concepts of blame and punishment—individual and
collective—and their relationship with excuses, as well as of my generic
categorization as ‘excuses’ of various exculpatory claims that may in fact
be saliently different. It also remains an open question whether all excuses
morally available to states should be recognized by the law or whether, in
some cases, pragmatic concerns or concerns of political morality
constitute insuperable obstacles.
Once again, my aim here was merely to map out various issues that
appear salient to me. For all I know, when all is said and done, the realm
of legitimate state excuses may turn out to be very limited indeed. Still, I
hope to have said enough in this chapter to convince you that, in respect of
many relevant facets of this debate, the jury is still out. The jury also
remains out in respect of many aspects of the broader topic of group
excuses considered as a class, as well as on the question of how, if at all,
state (and, more broadly, corporate) organizational structures may affect
the personal excuses of individuals operating under the them. The
theoretical road ahead is rich and challenging, and I certainly hope that, in
the near future, many more will be travelling it with me.
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